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Abstract 
Three experiments were able to demonstrate the usefulness of dual-process models for the 
understanding of the process of credibility attribution. According to the assumptions of dual-
process models, only high task involvement and/or high cognitive capacity leads to intensive 
processing of verbal and nonverbal information when making credibility judgments. Under 
low task involvement and /or low cognitive capacity, people predominantly use nonverbal 
information for their credibility attribution. In Experiment 1, participants under low or high 
task involvement saw a film in which the nonverbal behaviour (fidgety vs. calm) and the 
verbal information (low versus high credibility) of a source were manipulated. As predicted, 
when task involvement was low, only the nonverbal behaviour influenced participants' 
credibility attribution. Participants with high task involvement also used the verbal 
information. In Experiment 2 and 3, the cognitive capacity of the participants was 
manipulated. Participants with high cognitive capacity, in contrast to those of low cognitive 
capacity, used the verbal information for their credibility attribution.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: credibility attribution, lie detection, dual-process theories, detection of deception, 
lay judgment 
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Verbal and Nonverbal Behaviour as a Basis for Credibility Attribution: The Impact of Task 
Involvement and Cognitive Capacity 
Two major areas can be distinguished in research on deceptive communication. In the 
first, researchers try to isolate nonverbal and verbal correlates of deception. In several meta-
analytic reviews, Zuckerman, DePaulo, and Rosenthal (1981), Zuckerman and Driver (1985), 
and DePaulo, Lindsay, Malone, Muhlenbruck, Charlton, and Cooper (2003) reported only a 
few nonverbal and verbal cues that are consistently associated with deception. In his review, 
Vrij (2000) also came to the conclusion that there is no typical characteristic behaviour by 
which liars could be distinguished from truth-tellers. The results of a meta-analytic review by 
DePaulo et al. (2003) showed that liars are less forthcoming than truth-tellers, tell less 
compelling tales, make a more negative impression, and are more tense. Cues of deception 
were more pronounced when people were motivated to succeed and when lies were about 
transgressions (DePaulo et al., 2003).  
In the second area, researchers examine the question which cues are related to judgments 
about honesty and deceit. In several studies, lay persons and expert lie catchers (for example, 
police officers) were asked about their beliefs about cues associated with deception 
(Akehurst, Koehnken, Vrij, & Bull, 1996; Granhag, Andersson, Strömwall, & Hartwig, 2004; 
Hocking & Leather, 1980; Reinhard, Burghardt, Sporer, & Bursch, 2002; Strömwall & 
Granhag, 2003; Vrij & Taylor, 2003; Zuckerman, Koestner, & Driver, 1981; Koehnken, 
1988). Akehurst et al. (1996), for example, found that laypersons associated deception with 
an increase of pauses, repetitions, and nervous facial expressions. Laypersons also believed 
that liars show more self-manipulating behaviours, hand and leg movements, and an overall 
nervous bodily expression. The content of a deceptive statement was believed to be 
characterized by less logical consistency, more superfluous details, and more spontaneous 
corrections. Several studies found that these beliefs about deception were highly correlated 
with credibility judgments (Apple, Streeter, & Krauss, 1979; Bond, Kahler, & Paolicelli, 
1985; Kraut, 1978; Riggio & Friedman, 1983; Streeter, Krauss, Geller, Olson, & Apple, 
1977; Zuckerman et al., 1981). 
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In general, it can be noted that only a few cues that lay persons associate with deception 
are actually related to deceptive behaviour. Hence, it is not surprising that the accuracy in 
detecting deception in many studies is rather low (with accuracy rates falling in the range of 
45-60%; Koehnken, 1990; Vrij, 2000; Ekman & O’Sullivan, 1991). In a recent meta-analysis, 
Bond and DePaulo (2006) also found an accuracy rate of 54%. Koehnken (1990) concluded 
that most of the research on judgments about honesty and deceit has been concerned with 
detecting accuracy and not with the process of credibility attribution. As this situation has not 
much changed since Koehnken’s review, the aim of this article is to apply the theoretical 
assumptions of dual-process theories (e.g. the elaboration likelihood model (ELM; Petty & 
Wegener, 1999) or the heuristic-systematic model (HSM;  Chen & Chaiken, 1999)) to the 
field of credibility attribution.  
Dual-Process Theories 
In general, dual-process theories (for an overview, see Chaiken & Trope, 1999), 
differentiate two modes of information processing. The effortful mode (called central route in 
the ELM and systematic processing in the HSM) implies that individuals use all issue-
relevant information, especially the content of a message, to develop or change an attitude. 
This process requires higher motivation and higher cognitive ability and capacity. Persons 
with lower motivation and/or lower cognitive ability/capacity use the effortless mode of 
processing (called peripheral route in the ELM and heuristic processing in the HSM). They 
use, for example, easy judgmental rules (heuristics) like “experts' statements can be trusted” 
or “consensus opinions are correct” to form their opinion. In general, the basic assumption of 
dual-process theories is that the amount of a person’s motivation and capacity causes the 
intensity of information processing. Overall, dual-process theories have been well tested 
empirically (for an overview see Bohner & Waenke, 2002; Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Eagly & 
Chaiken, 1993; Petty & Wegener, 1999). Outside the persuasion context, dual-process 
theories have been developed, for example, to explain the process of person perception (Fiske 
& Neuberg, 1990; Fiske, Lin, & Neuberg, 1999), attitude-behaviour consistency (Fazio & 
Towles-Schwen, 1999), or the prediction of expectancies (Dickhaeuser & Reinhard, 2006). 
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We therefore argue that the basic assumption of dual-process theories could also be used to 
explain the process of credibility attribution. 
There is some indirect support for the usefulness of the basic assumptions of dual-
process theories in the field of deceptive communication research (Forrest and Feldman, 
2000; Reinhard & Sporer, 2007; Stiff, Miller, Sleight, Mongeau, Garlick, & Rogan, 1989). 
For example, Stiff et al. (1989) argued that detectors use verbal information to make their 
credibility judgments only in familiar situations. In unfamiliar situations, people use cultural 
norms (heuristics) of what a liar ”looks like,” for example, the frequency of hand shrugs, to 
come to a decision. The results from Stiff et al. (1989) lend partial support to the situational 
familiarity hypothesis. As predicted, people in the familiar condition used only the verbal but 
not the nonverbal information to judge veracity. However, inconsistent with the assumptions, 
judgments of veracity in the unfamiliar condition were influenced significantly by the verbal 
and nonverbal behaviour.  
Although some authors have argued that the basic assumptions of dual-process theories 
could be fruitfully used to explain the process of credibility attribution (Forrest & Feldman, 
2000; Koehnken, 1990; Reinhard & Sporer, 2007; Stiff, Miller, Sleight, Mongeau, Garlick, & 
Rogan, 1989), these basic assumptions have so far not been directly tested in research on 
credibility attribution. To directly test the assumption that only high motivation/capacity 
leads to effortful processing of verbal information, it is necessary to manipulate verbal and 
nonverbal information independently. In the field of attitude research, the direct manipulation 
of the quality of content (arguments) and peripheral information is a common procedure to 
test whether people are engaged in peripheral/heuristic or central/systematic processing (e.g. 
Bohner, Rank, Reinhard, Einwiller, & Erb, 1998; Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994). We 
therefore designed a videotaped conversation in which we orthogonally manipulated both 
verbal and nonverbal cues. This experimental procedure for directly manipulating verbal and 
nonverbal cues was also used in recent studies in research on credibility attribution (e.g. 
Freedman, Adam, Davey, & Koegl, 1996; Stiff, Miller, Sleight, Mongeau, Garlick, & Rogan, 
1989). Although this procedure provides the opportunity to directly test whether people use 
verbal or nonverbal information for their credibility attribution, it does have limitations. 
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Actual judgements of truth and deception, which are commonly of interest in the field of 
deception research, could not be tested with this procedure. Actors show verbal and/or 
nonverbal cues to appear high or low in credibility, but they do not actually tell the truth or 
lie.  
In line with the basic assumptions of dual-process models, we argue that people under 
high motivation use central/systematic processing and both verbal and nonverbal cue 
information for their credibility judgments. When peripheral/heuristic processing takes place, 
only nonverbal information will be used. The aim of the present study was to directly test the 
assumption that only high task involvement leads to effortful processing of verbal 
information when judging the credibility of a statement. In contrast, low task involvement 
should lead to heuristic peripheral/processing of nonverbal information when judging the 
credibility of a statement. Individuals in this condition should use easy judgemental rules like 
“liars are often nervous” when attributing credibility. In Experiment 1, we manipulated the 
task involvement for the credibility judgment, the verbal cue information, and the nonverbal 
cue information during the statement to test the assumption that high – but not low - 
involvement leads to the use of verbal and non-verbal information. We further assumed that 
participants under low involvement would process peripherally/heuristically and use 
primarily the nonverbal behaviour for their credibility judgements. 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants 
Eighty female and eighty male psychology students at the University of Giessen (mean 
age = 25.3) participated for departmental credit. 
Design 
The design was a 2 x 2 x 2 between-subjects design, with verbal information (truthful 
cues or deceptive cues), nonverbal information (truthful cues or deceptive cues), and 
participants' task involvement (low or high), with 20 participants randomly assigned to each 
of the 8 cells in the design. The sex of the participants was controlled.1 
Stimulus Material 
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We created four parallel versions of a short film (about two minutes long) showing a 
conversation between a woman (Anna) looking for a successor to take over her current rental 
contract for her apartment and another woman (Maria) looking at the apartment for rent. The 
two women were amateur actresses who volunteered to participate in the film. The camera 
was set up in such a way that in each version of the film one could only see Anna, but hear 
both Anna's and Maria's voices. 
Verbal cue manipulation. We manipulated the verbal information of Anna's statements 
about the apartment. Consistent with the findings of previous studies (Kraut, 1978; Stiff & 
Miller, 1986; Stiff et al., 1989), the truthful statements were manipulated so as to be judged 
more consistent and more plausible than the deceptive statements.2  
Nonverbal cue information. In addition, we used three nonverbal cues - gaze aversion, 
adaptors, and posture shifts - to simulate truthful and deceptive nonverbal behaviour. 
Previous research found these cues to be related to lay persons' credibility judgments (Miller 
& Stiff, 1993; Stiff et al., 1989; Zuckerman & Driver, 1985; Zuckerman et al. 1981; Vrij, 
2000). The actress displayed more gaze aversion, more adaptors, and more posture shifts 
when simulating deceptive nonverbal information.3 
Task involvement. The involvement of the participants was manipulated via written 
instructions. In the high-involvement condition, participants were told that the study was very 
important for future psychological research. People were also told that their personal 
judgments were important for the success of the study. Participants in the low-involvement 
condition were told that the aim of the study was to obtain data for an introductory course in 
methods of psychology. 
Procedure 
The Experiment was labelled as a study dealing with lying in everyday life. Participants 
were told that they would watch a short film and then would be asked a few questions about 
it. Before watching the film, the motivation of the participants was measured with a 
questionnaire with four items (Cronbach’s alpha = .91). The film was introduced to the 
participants as follows: 
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Now we will show you a typical everyday life situation: Anna is 26 years old and just 
finished her studies in business administration in Giessen. She lives in a one-room 
apartment in the inner city of Giessen. Two weeks ago Anna was offered a good job 
in a different city and she will start her new job next month. Looking for a successor 
to take over her current rental contract, she has an appointment with Maria, who is 
looking for an apartment. We will now show you a short film of the inspection of the 
apartment. Afterwards we will ask you some questions. 
Participants watched one of the four stimulus films, which was presented on a 25-in 
colour monitor, and completed a brief questionnaire. At the end, participants were fully 
debriefed and asked not to discuss the study with others. 
Measures 
The credibility attribution was measured with five items each with a 9-point scale 
(“Anna was….. credible, honest, reliable, sincere, and truthful;” Cronbach's alpha = .97). The 
perception of the verbal cues were assessed with five items on a 9-point scale (“The verbal 
message of Anna was …..very plausible, consistent, coherent, structured, specific;” 
Cronbach's alpha = .81). The perception of the nonverbal cues were measured with five items 
on a 9-point scale (“Did Anna frequently hold eye-contact with Maria during the dialog?;” 
“How often did Anna look at Maria during the dialog?;” “How many body movements did 
Anna show during the dialog with Maria?;” “How often did Anna move during the dialog 
with Maria?;” “Did Anna handle with fidget objects during the dialog with Maria?;” 
Cronbach's alpha = .91). 
Results 
The data of the 160 participants were analyzed by separate 2 (involvement: low versus 
high) x 2 (verbal information: truthful cues or deceptive cues) x 2 (nonverbal information: 
truthful cues or deceptive cues)  ANOVAs.  
Manipulation Checks 
Task involvement. The manipulation of task involvement was successful. As expected, 
participants in the high-involvement condition reported significantly higher importance of the 
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task (M = 5.99, SD = 1.47) than did participants in the low-involvement condition (M = 4.49, 
SD = 1.37), F(1, 152) = 43.30, p < .001, eta-squared  = 0.22. All other Fs < 1. 
Verbal cues. Participants evaluated the verbal information of the statements as 
significantly more plausible in the truthful cue (M = 5.67, SD = 0.76) than in the deceptive 
cue condition (M = 4.24, SD = 1.68), F(1, 152) = 46.72, p < .001, eta-squared = 0.24. All 
other Fs < 1. 
Nonverbal cues. As predicted, participants evaluated the overall behavior of Anna as 
significantly less believable in the deceptive cue (M = 3.96, SD = 1.31) than in the truthful 
cue (M = 5.35, SD = 1.31) nonverbal information condition, F(1, 152) = 43.52, p < .001, eta-
squared = 0.22. All other Fs < 1. 
Credibility attribution 
The five items measuring the credibility attributions showed a high reliability 
(Cronbach's alpha = .97) and were combined into a credibility index. The means of the 
credibility attributions for all eight conditions are displayed in Table 1. A significant main 
effect of nonverbal information emerged, F(1, 152) = 54.64, p < .001, eta-squared = 0.26. 
Participants gave higher credibility judgments in the truthful cue (M = 5.66, SD = 1.36) than 
in the deceptive cue (M = 4.33, SD = 1.08) nonverbal information condition. Participants 
under high motivation gave higher credibility ratings (M = 5.33, SD = 1.41) than participants 
under low motivation (M = 4.65, SD = 1.30), F(1, 152) = 14.49, p < .001, eta-squared = 0.09. 
Furthermore, there was a significant main effect of verbal information, F(1, 152) = 10.04, p < 
.005, eta-squared = 0.06 (truthful verbal cue condition: M = 5.28, SD = 1.54; deceptive verbal 
cue condition: M = 4.71, SD = 1.17). 
The predicted interaction of involvement and verbal information (see Figure 1) was also 
significant, F(1, 152) = 6.82, p < .05, eta-squared = 0.04. Participants in the high-
involvement condition gave higher credibility judgements in the truthful cue (M = 5.85, SD = 
1.45) than in the deceptive cue verbal information condition (M = 4.81, SD = 1.17), F(1, 152) 
= 16.70, p < .001, eta-squared = 0.10. Participants in the low-involvement condition did not 
differentiate between truthful cue and deceptive cue verbal information, (Ms = 4.70 and 4.60, 
SDs = 1.43 and 1.19, respectively), F < 1. No other effects became significant, all Fs < 1.  
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Discussion 
The manipulations of motivation, nonverbal cue and, verbal cue information were highly 
successful. Especially the manipulation of nonverbal cue information and verbal cue 
information produced equally strong effects on our manipulation checks. 
The results were in line with our hypotheses, derived from dual-process theories, that 
participants' task involvement moderates the use of verbal cue information when attributing 
the credibility of a statement. Highly involved participants followed the central route 
(systematic processing) and relied on the verbal cue to judge the veracity of the statement. 
They used the consistency and plausibility of the statement to make a judgment. In contrast, 
low-motivated participants were not influenced by the consistency and plausibility of the 
verbal cues. They relied exclusively on the nonverbal cues to make their judgment. 
Independent of the task involvement, participants used the nonverbal cues for their credibility 
decision. In line with other findings (Miller & Stiff, 1993; Stiff et al. 1989; Zuckerman & 
Driver, 1985; Zuckerman et al., 1981; Vrij, 2000), participants judged the statement less 
credible when the source displayed gaze aversion, adaptors, and posture shifts. Dual-process 
theories argue that people with low task involvement use effortless ways to arrive at a 
judgment (Chen & Chaiken, 1999; Petty & Wegener, 1999). They rely on information that is 
relatively easy to use in forming credibility attributions, like nonverbal cues. The results of 
Experiment 1 support these theoretical assumptions.  
According to dual-process theories, people with higher task involvement use a more 
extensive processing mode to obtain an accurate judgment. Attitude research inspired by 
dual-process theories often reports that people in the central/systematic processing mode use 
only verbal information (arguments) (Chen & Chaiken, 1999; Petty & Wegener, 1999). In 
our first experiment they used all available information, both nonverbal and verbal cues, to 
form their judgment. According to both the ELM and the HSM, the two processing modes 
(central/systematic and peripheral/heuristic processing) may co-occur (Chaiken & 
Maheswaran, 1994; Maheswaran & Chaiken, 1991; Maheswaran, Mackie, & Chaiken, 1992; 
Petty & Cacioppo, 1984; Petty & Wegener, 1999). In our data, the manipulation of verbal and 
nonverbal cues leads to independent additive effects for highly motivated participants.  
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If one favors the HSM, the additivity hypothesis postulates two independent effects of 
nonverbal and verbal information (e.g., Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994). But the predictions 
were also in line with the basic assumption of the ELM that peripheral information can have 
an impact under low or high involvement (Petty & Wegener, 1999). For example, Petty and 
Cacioppo (1984) found that the attractiveness of a source in an advertisement for a beauty 
product had an impact under both low and high-involvement conditions. Petty and Cacioppo 
argued that whereas individuals under low involvement used the attractiveness of the source 
as a cue, individuals under high involvement used the attractiveness as an argument (in the 
context of beauty products). In line with research on beliefs about cues of deception (e.g. 
Akehurst, Koehnken, Vrij, & Bull, 1996; Granhag, Andersson, Strömwall, & Hartwig, 2004), 
we would argue that people believe that verbal and nonverbal cues are both valid indicators 
of credibility of a source. Individuals under high motivation therefore used all valid 
indicators, verbal and nonverbal cues, for their credibility attribution.  
In summary, the results of Experiment 1 show that applying the basic assumptions of 
dual-process theories to the field of credibility attribution can be fruitful. By way of criticism, 
it could be argued that although people with low motivation used only nonverbal cues for 
their credibility attribution, Experiment 1 could not provide direct evidence that the use of 
nonverbal cues is easier and requires less cognitive resources than the processing of verbal 
cues. To test that assumption, in Experiment 2 we directly manipulated, besides nonverbal 
and verbal cue information, the cognitive resources people had available when making 
credibility attributions.   
Experiment 2 
The aim of Experiment 2 was to directly test the hypotheses that nonverbal cue 
information is easier to process than verbal cue information. If this argument is true, people 
with limited cognitive capacity should use nonverbal cues for their credibility judgments. To 
test this assumption, we used a secondary task technique inducing high cognitive load (see 
Paas, Tuovinen, Tabbers, & Gerven, 2003) in order to limit cognitive capacity. In detail, we 
tested the following hypotheses. First, if cognitive load is high, people should use nonverbal 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
Credibility Attribution 12
but not verbal cues for their credibility attribution. Second, if cognitive load is low, people 
should use both nonverbal and verbal cues for their credibility attribution.  
Method 
Participants 
Ninety-six female and one-hundred and four male students at the University of Giessen 
(mean age = 23.9) participated as volunteers in partial fulfilment of departmental 
requirements. The study lasted 20 minutes.  
Design 
The design was a 2 x 2 x 2 between-participants design, with verbal information 
(truthful cues or deceptive cues), nonverbal information (truthful cues or deceptive cues), and 
cognitive load of participants (low or high) completely crossed. Twenty-five participants 
were randomly assigned to each of the eight cells in the design. 
Procedure 
Participants were seated alone in front of a computer and were reminded that the present 
study examined memory processes. All instructions were provided on screen. Participants in 
the high cognitive load group were then given the following instruction: "On the next screen 
you will see a nine-digit number for 60 seconds. Please try to keep this number in mind 
during the following assignment and questions. You will be asked to recall the number later. 
We will compare the recalled number with the actual number." The next screen then 
displayed the number (813947284) for 60 seconds. This task was absent in the low cognitive 
load condition.  
To maintain the salience of the cover story, participants in both conditions received four 
questions on autobiographical memory ("How many courses in biology did you take in high 
school?," "How many friends did you have during your time at the high school?," "How 
many bicycles did you have until now?," and "How many papers did you present during your 
time at the university?").  
Next, participants watched the film already used in Experiment 1 and the following 
dependent measures were assessed. First, the credibility attribution was measured with the 
five items used in Experiment 1 (Cronbach's alpha = .92). We also used a single item to asses 
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a judgment of truth or deception (“Was Anna deceptive or truthful?” Scale from 1 = 
deceptive to 9 = truthful). Then the perception of the verbal cues and the perception of the 
nonverbal cues were measured with the same items used in Experiment 1 (Cronbach's alpha 
= .98 and .97). Finally, participants answered four questions on their self-perceived 
distraction whereas answering the questions concerning autobiographical memory and the 
questions about the film (manipulation check; Cronbach's alpha = .97). One example item 
was: "I felt distracted while seeing the film and answering the questions.” These questions 
were answered on a scale ranging from 1 (completely disagree) to 9 (completely agree). 
Results 
The data of the 200 participants were analyzed by separate univariate 2 (cognitive load: 
low versus high) x 2 (nonverbal cues: deceptive versus truthful) x 2 (verbal cues: deceptive 
versus truthful) ANOVAs.4  
Manipulation Checks 
Cognitive Load. The findings show that the experimental distraction manipulation was 
successful: cognitive load had a strong effect on the perceived distraction, F(1, 192) = 47.00, 
p < .001; eta-squared = 0.20. Perceived distraction was higher for participants with high than 
for those with low cognitive load (M = 5.95, SD = 1.50 vs. M = 4.53, SD = 1.38). All other Fs 
< 1. 
Verbal cues. The expected main effect of the verbal cue manipulation became highly 
significant, F(1, 192) = 57.34, p < .001, eta-squared  = 0.23. Participants evaluated the verbal 
information of the statements as significantly more plausible in the truthful cue (M = 5.46, 
SD = 1.71) than in the deceptive cue information condition (M = 3.78, SD = 1.38). All other 
Fs < 1. 
Nonverbal cues. As predicted, participants evaluated the overall behaviour of Anna as 
significantly less believable in the deceptive cue (M = 3.89, SD = 1.09) than in the truthful 
cue (M = 5.12, SD = 1.70) nonverbal information condition, F(1, 192) = 36.29, p < .001, eta-
squared = 0.16. All other Fs < 1. 
Major dependent variables  
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Credibility attribution. The means of both major dependent measures for all eight 
conditions are displayed in Table 2. The main effect of nonverbal information was 
significant, F(1, 192) = 54.75, p < .001, eta-squared  = 0.22. Participants attributed higher 
credibility in the truthful cue (M = 5.18, SD = 1.12) than in the deceptive cue (M = 4.15, SD = 
0.97) nonverbal information condition. There was also a significant main effect of verbal 
information, F(1, 192) = 19.66, p < .001,  eta-squared = 0.09 (truthful verbal cues: M = 4.98, 
SD = 1.21; deceptive verbal cues: M = 4.35, SD = 1.05). 
The predicted interaction of cognitive load and verbal information (see Figure 2) was 
significant, F(1, 192) = 9.57, p < .005, eta-squared = 0.05. Participants in the low cognitive 
load condition attributed higher credibility in the truthful cue (M = 5.18, SD = 1.24) than in 
the deceptive cue verbal information condition (M = 4.12, SD = 1.08), F(1, 192) = 28.55, p < 
.001, eta-squared = 0.13. Participants in the high cognitive load condition did not 
differentiate between truthful cue and deceptive cue verbal information, (Ms = 4.77 and 4.58, 
SDs = 1.14 and 0.96, respectively), F < 1. No other effects became significant, all Fs < 1.  
Judgment of truth and deception. The ANOVA yielded a significant main effect of 
verbal information on participants’ judgment of truth and deception , F(1, 192) = 7.75, p < 
.01, eta-squared  = 0.04. In the deceptive verbal cue information condition, participants 
judged the source as more deceptive (M = 4.43, SD = 1.50) than in the truthful cue verbal 
information condition (M = 4.96, SD = 1.47). Moreover, the main effect of nonverbal 
information was also significant, F(1, 192) = 35.24, p < .001,  eta-squared = 0.16. 
Participants perceived the source as more deceptive in the deceptive cue (M = 4.13, SD = 
1.31) than in the truthful cue nonverbal information condition (M = 5.26, SD = 1.48).  
The predicted interaction of cognitive load with verbal information was also significant, 
F(1, 192) = 10.95, p < .005, eta-squared = 0.05. Participants in the low cognitive load 
condition perceived the source as more deceptive in the deceptive verbal cue (M = 4.06, SD = 
1.60) than in the truthful verbal cue condition, (M = 5.22, SD = 1.43), F(1, 192) = 18.57, p < 
.001, eta-squared = 0.09. Participants in the high cognitive load condition did not 
differentiate between verbal truthful and deceptive cues (Ms = 4.80 and 4.70, SDs = 1.30 and 
1.47, respectively, Fs < 1. All other ps > .19. 
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Discussion 
The results clearly confirm the hypotheses that participants under low cognitive load 
followed the central route (systematic processing) and relied on both the verbal cues and the 
nonverbal cues to judge credibility. In contrast, participants under high cognitive load were 
uninfluenced by verbal cues. Independently of the consistency and plausibility of the 
statement, they relied exclusively on the nonverbal cues to make their credibility attribution. 
More credibility was attributed in the truthful nonverbal cue than in the deceptive nonverbal 
cue condition. The above-described interaction of load with verbal information showed the 
same pattern for both the credibility attribution and the judgement of truth and deception.   
Both the results of Experiment 1 and 2 support the usefulness of the basic assumptions 
of dual-process theories to explain the influence of task involvement and cognitive capacity 
on the process of credibility attribution. Moreover, Experiment 2 found direct evidence that 
nonverbal (in contrast to verbal) cue information is easier to use when attributing the 
credibility. Nonverbal cues were used under conditions of both high and low cognitive load. 
In contrast, the verbal cues were used only by individuals with high cognitive capacity (low 
cognitive load) for their credibility attribution. In a third Experiment, we wanted to replicate 
the findings of Experiment 2 with different experimental material. Moreover, in Experiment 
3 we assessed participants’ reasons for their credibility attribution in order to examine our 
assumption that people under high cognitive load use nonverbal but not verbal information 
for their credibility attribution. We predicted, first, that under high cognitive load participants 
would report more nonverbal-related reasons than verbal-related reasons. In contrast, 
participants under low cognitive load would report more verbal-related reasons than 
nonverbal-related reasons. Second, we assumed that for participants under high cognitive 
load, credibility attribution could best be predicted by the valence of nonverbal-related 
reasons, but not by the valence of verbal-related reasons. For participants under low cognitive 
load, credibility attribution could be predicted by the valence of both nonverbal-related 
reasons and verbal-related reasons. 
Experiment 3 
Method 
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Participants 
Seventy-three female and seventy-one male students at the University of Mannheim 
(mean age = 24.2) participated as volunteers in partial fulfilment of departmental 
requirements. The study lasted 25 minutes.  
Design 
The design was a 2 x 2 x 2 between-participants design, with verbal information 
(truthful cues or deceptive cues), nonverbal information (truthful cues or deceptive cues), and 
cognitive load of participants (low or high) completely crossed. Eighteen participants were 
randomly assigned to each of the eight cells in the design. 
Procedure 
Participants were treated identically to the procedure in Experiment 2, with the 
exception that the participants saw a different film. We created four parallel versions of a 
short film of about five minutes about an argument between a woman (Sabine) and her 
boyfriend (Carsten) about a broken appointment. The woman and the man were amateur 
performer who volunteered to participate in the film. The camera was set up in such a way 
that in each version of the film one could only see Carsten, but hear both Carsten's and 
Sabine's voices. We manipulated the verbal content of Carsten's statements about his non-
appearance. Parallel to the material used in Experiment 1 and 2, the truthful statements were 
manipulated so as to be judged more consistent and more plausible than the deceptive 
statements.5 In addition, we used three nonverbal cues - gaze aversion, adaptors, and posture 
shifts - to simulate truthful and deceptive nonverbal behaviour. The actor displayed more 
gaze aversion, more adaptors, and more posture shifts when simulating deceptive nonverbal 
information.6 
After participants had watched the film, the following dependent measures were 
assessed. First, the credibility attribution was measured with the five items used in 
Experiment 1 and 2 (Cronbach's alpha = .86). Next we asked participants to give reasons for 
their credibility attribution. On a blank sheet, participants had to write down reasons why 
they thought Carsten had low or high credibility. Then the perception of the verbal cues and 
the perception of the nonverbal cues were measured with the same items used in the previous 
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two Experiments (Cronbach's alpha = .95 and .93). Finally, the manipulation check for the 
self-perceived distraction was assessed with the same items used in Experiment 2 
(Cronbach's alpha = .95). 
Results 
The data of the 144 participants were analyzed by separate univariate 2 (cognitive load: 
low versus high) x 2 (nonverbal cues: deceptive versus truthful) x 2 (verbal cues: deceptive 
versus truthful) ANOVAs.  
Manipulation Checks 
Cognitive Load. The experimental distraction manipulation was successful: cognitive 
load had a strong effect on the perceived distraction, F(1, 136) = 76.29, p < .001; eta-squared  
= 0.36. Perceived distraction was higher for participants with high than for those with low 
cognitive load (M = 5.91, SD = 1.93 vs. M =  3.53, SD = 1.19).7 All other Fs < 1. 
Verbal Cues. The expected main effect of the verbal cue manipulation became 
significant, F(1, 136) = 12.64, p < .005, eta-squared = 0.09. Participants evaluated the content 
of the statements as significantly more plausible in the truthful (M = 5.62, SD = 1.23) than in 
the deceptive verbal cues condition (M = 4.70, SD = 1.78). All other Fs < 1. 
Nonverbal Cues. As predicted, participants evaluated the overall behaviour of Anna as 
significantly less believable in the deceptive (M =3.66, SD = 1.82) than in the truthful (M = 
4.67, SD = 1.28) nonverbal cues condition, F(1, 136) = 14.33, p < .001, eta-squared = 0.10. 
All other Fs < 1. 
Major dependent variables  
Credibility attribution. The means of both major dependent measures for all eight 
conditions are displayed in Table 3. The main effect of nonverbal information was 
significant, F(1, 136) = 25.37, p < .001, eta-squared  = 0.16. Participants attributed higher 
credibility in the truthful (M = 5.02, SD = 1.85) than in the deceptive (M = 3.79, SD = 1.17) 
nonverbal cue condition. There was also a significant main effect of verbal information, F(1, 
136) = 9.86, p < .005, eta-squared = 0.07 (truthful verbal cues: M = 4.79, SD = 1.71; 
deceptive verbal cues: M = 4.02, SD = 1.53). 
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The predicted interaction of cognitive load and verbal information (see Figure 3) was 
significant, F(1, 136) = 9.00, p < .005, eta-squared = 0.06. Participants in the low cognitive 
load condition attribute higher credibility to the truthful verbal (M = 5.00, SD = 1.61) than the 
deceptive verbal cue (M = 3.50, SD = 1.16), F(1, 136) = 18.67, p < .001, eta-squared = 0.12. 
Participants in the high cognitive load condition did not differentiate between truthful and 
deceptive verbal cues, (Ms = 4.44 and 4.58, SDs = 1.69 and 1.81, respectively), F < 1. No 
other effects became significant, all ps > .20.  
Reasons for the credibility attribution. Two independent judges, who were blind to the 
experimental conditions and the hypotheses of the experiment, coded the reasons listed by the 
participants as either verbal-content-related or source-nonverbal-related, and as positive or 
negative in their valence. For example, the listed reason “Carsten’s statements were 
implausible since he would have heard the telephone” was coded as negative verbal-related. 
The reason “Carsten was not at all nervous, I would believe him” was coded as positive 
nonverbal-related. The two judges had a high inter-rater agreement (Cohen’s kappa = .94). 
The index of verbal-related reasons was defined as number of verbal-related reasons/ total 
number of reasons. The index of nonverbal-related reasons was defined as number of 
nonverbal-related reasons/ total number of reasons. To test whether verbal-related reasons 
were more frequently reported in the low load than the high load condition, and whether 
nonverbal-related reasons were more frequently reported in the high load than the low load 
condition, the number of verbal-related reasons and source-nonverbal related reasons were 
analyzed as a function of cognitive load, verbal information, and nonverbal information, 
using the type of reported reasons as a repeated measure. The total number of reported 
reasons was included as a covariate. Participants reported generally more verbal-related 
reasons (M = 1.74, SD = 0.89) than nonverbal-related reasons (M = 1.08, SD = 0.85), F(1, 
136) = 26.12, p < .001, eta-squared = 0.16. Moreover, the expected interaction of cognitive 
load with type of reasons was significant, F(1, 136) = 6.94, p < .01, eta-squared = 0.05 (see 
Figure 4). Under low cognitive load, participants reported, in line with our hypotheses, 
significantly more verbal-related (M = 1.94, SD = 0.92) than nonverbal-related reasons (M = 
0.94, SD = 0.75), F(1, 136) = 60.00, p < .001; eta-squared = 0.30. Under high cognitive load, 
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participants unexpectedly also reported significantly more verbal-related (M = 1.54, SD = 
0.82) than nonverbal-related reasons (M = 1.22, SD = 0.92), but this difference was quite a bit 
smaller, F(1, 136) = 6.14, p < .05; eta-squared = 0.04. No other effects were significant (p > 
.30). 
We compute the valence of verbal-related and nonverbal-related reasons by subtracting 
negative from positive verbal-related reasons (valence of verbal), and by subtracting negative 
from positive nonverbal-related reasons (valence of nonverbal). To test, first, the hypothesis 
that the verbal manipulation affects the verbal related reasons only for participants under low 
cognitive load, and, second, that the nonverbal information affects the nonverbal-related 
reasons for participants under high and low cognitive load, the valences of verbal-related 
reasons and source-nonverbal related reasons were analyzed as a function of cognitive load, 
verbal information, and nonverbal information, using the type of valence as a repeated 
measure. The total number of reported reasons was included as a covariate. Overall, the 
valence of verbal-related reasons (M = 0.72, SD = 1.28) was more positive than the valence 
of nonverbal-related reasons (M = 0.14, SD = 1.15), F(1, 135) = 28.33, p < .001, eta-squared 
= 0.17. The interaction of nonverbal cue manipulation with type of reasons was significant, 
F(1, 135) = 11.93, p < .005, eta-squared = 0.08  (valence of nonverbal-related: deceptive 
nonverbal cue (M = -0.44, SD = 1.18) vs. truthful nonverbal cue (M = 0.47, SD = 1.15); 
valence of verbal-related: deceptive nonverbal cue (M = 0.72, SD = 1.33) vs. truthful 
nonverbal cue (M = 0.71, SD = 1.25). Most interestingly, the predicted interaction of 
cognitive load with verbal manipulation with type of valence of reasons was significant, F(1, 
135) = 9.84, p < .01, eta-squared = 0.07  (see Table 4). Whereas under both load conditions 
the valence of nonverbal-related reasons were not influenced by the verbal manipulation (all 
p > .20), a different pattern was found for the valence of verbal-related reasons. Under low 
cognitive load, the valence of verbal-related reasons were significantly influenced by the 
verbal manipulation, with more negative reasons in the deceptive verbal cue (M = -0.33, SD 
= 1.17) than in the truthful verbal cue condition (M = 1.39, SD = 1.15), F(1, 135) = 85.89, p < 
.001; eta-squared = 0.38. In the high load condition, no difference was found between the 
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deceptive and truthful cue condition (deceptive verbal cue: M = 0.92, SD = 1.05 vs. truthful 
verbal cue: M = 0.89, SD = 1.14, F < 1)8. 
A multiple linear regression analysis was applied to investigate the mechanisms 
underlying credibility attribution. First, the valence of nonverbal-related reasons should 
predict credibility attribution for both load conditions. Moreover, it was postulated that the 
valence of verbal-related reasons would determine credibility attribution differently, 
depending on cognitive load. Accordingly, for the prediction of credibility attribution, a 
significant coefficient was expected from the interaction term of load and valence of verbal-
related reasons. Valence scores were standardized. Interaction terms were then computed by 
multiplying load (coded “0” for high and “1” for low load) by valence of verbal-related 
reasons and valence of nonverbal-related reasons. We included number of reasons as a 
covariate. 
The results of the regression predicting credibility attribution can be seen in Table 5. R 
for the regression was significantly different from zero, F (6, 137) = 15.19, p < .001. 
Altogether, 39.9% (37.3% adjusted) of the variability in credibility attribution was predicted 
by the independent variables. The interaction term of load with valence of nonverbal-related 
reasons was not significant. In line with our assumptions the interaction term of load with 
valence of verbal-related reasons showed a statistically significant effect in the equation (B = 
1.02, t(137) = 4.35, p < .001). The interaction terms showed that the impact of valence of 
verbal-related reasons on credibility attribution was different in the load conditions. To 
justify the usage of valence indices as bipolar evaluations in the regression analyses, we also 
conducted separate linear regression analyses to investigate the mechanisms underlying 
credibility attribution for positive or negative verbal and nonverbal reasons (see Blanton, 
Jaccard, Gonzeles, & Christie, 2006; Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1997). The results of 
these separate analyses parallel the results of the regression analysis with the valence 
indices9. 
To investigate the nature of this interaction, we used the recentering procedure discussed 
by Cohen, Cohen, and West (2002). First, to test the influence of nonverbal- and verbal-
related reasons on the credibility attribution for the low load condition, we coded low load to 
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be 0 and high load to be 1. In a regression, credibility attribution was predicted by load, 
verbal-related reasons, nonverbal-related reasons, and the first-order cross-products of load 
with verbal-related reasons and nonverbal-related reasons. In this analysis, credibility 
attribution was predicted by valence of nonverbal- and verbal-related reasons. Both valence 
indices had a statistically significant effect in the equation, (verbal: B = 0.71, t(137) = 4.99, p 
< .001; nonverbal: B = 0.75, t(137) = 4.30, p < .001). Second, to test the influence of 
nonverbal- and verbal-related reasons on the credibility attribution for the high load 
condition, we coded low load to be 1 and high load to be 0. In a regression, credibility 
attribution was predicted by load, verbal-related reasons, nonverbal-related reasons, and the 
first-order cross-products of load with verbal-related reasons and nonverbal-related reasons. 
Here, only the valence of nonverbal-related reasons had a statistically significant effect on the 
prediction of attribution, B = 0.79, t(137) = 5.37, p < .001, whereas the coefficient of valence 
of verbal-related reasons was statistically not significant (B = - 0.31, t(137) = -1.66, p = 
.099).  
Discussion 
The results replicated the findings of Experiment 2 with different experimental material 
and provided further evidence that the amount of cognitive capacity affects the use of 
nonverbal and verbal information in the process of credibility attribution. First, as in 
Experiment 2, under high cognitive load (and thus with less cognitive capacity) only the 
manipulation of nonverbal behaviour had an impact on participants’ credibility attribution. 
The manipulation of verbal information did not influence the credibility attribution for 
participants with less cognitive capacity. When sufficient cognitive capacity was available, 
the manipulation of both verbal and nonverbal information had an effect on the credibility 
attribution. Second, the results of the reported reasons for the credibility judgments in 
Experiment 3 strengthen the theoretical assumption that cognitive capacity did affect the use 
of nonverbal and verbal information. When the cognitive capacity of participants was limited, 
more nonverbal-related reasons than verbal-related reasons were reported, and the credibility 
judgment could be predicted by the valence of nonverbal-related reasons, but not by the 
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valence of verbal-related reasons. In contrast, for participants with sufficient cognitive 
capacity, both valence indices were good predictors for the credibility judgment.  
 
General Discussion 
Dual-process models and the process of credibility attribution 
Three experiments demonstrated the usefulness of dual-process theories to explain the 
process of credibility attribution.  In particular, the influence of task involvement and 
cognitive capacity on the choice of more or less extensive information processing was 
examined. The results of all three experiments were in line with the assumption that high, in 
contrast to low, task involvement/cognitive capacity leads to central/systematic processing 
when judging credibility. This assumption was tested and confirmed with different 
experimental material. Experiment 1 showed that participants in a high-involved state used 
all judgment-relevant information. They judged a statement as more credible when the source 
showed no nonverbal cues of deception, and when the statement was plausible. In contrast, 
participants with low task involvement used only the source cue information (nonverbal 
information) for their credibility attribution. The verbal information had no impact. 
Experiment 2 and 3 showed that the manipulation of cognitive load had a parallel effect on 
the process of credibility attribution. When the cognitive load was low, participants used both 
the verbal and nonverbal information for their credibility attribution. Under high cognitive 
load, only the manipulation of nonverbal information had an impact on participants’ 
credibility attribution. Moreover, the results of Experiment 2 and 3 found evidence that 
nonverbal information was easier to use than verbal information when attributing credibility. 
Whereas verbal information was used only when cognitive load was low, nonverbal 
information was also used when participants had limited cognitive capacity available. The 
coded reasons participants reported for their credibility attribution strengthen our 
interpretation: For participants with sufficient cognitive resources, the credibility attribution 
could be predicted by both the verbal-related and nonverbal-related reasons. In contrast, only 
nonverbal-related reasons had an impact on the credibility attribution of participants with 
restricted cognitive resources. In sum, the reported three Experiments found clear support for 
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the basic assumption - derived from dual-process models - that motivation and cognitive 
capacity influence the use of more or less extensive information processing.  
Further research 
The present work demonstrates the fruitfulness of applying dual-process theories as a 
theoretical framework to the field of deceptive communication research, especially to the 
process of credibility attribution. Dual-process theories make clear predictions about the 
conditions under which individuals use more extensive processing modes, and thus use 
verbal information more intensely to judge the credibility of a statement (Chen & Chaiken, 
1999; Petty & Wegener, 1999). Aside from task involvement and cognitive capacity, as well 
as personal dispositions such as ”need for cognition” (NFC; Cacioppo & Petty, 1982), a 
tendency to enjoy cognitive activities may also influence the choice of central/systematic or 
peripheral/heuristic processing. For example, people with high NFC should use a more 
extensive central/systematic route of processing, and people with low NFC should use the 
simpler peripheral/heuristic route when judging the veracity of information.  
In our view, the results are also in accordance with the unimodel (Kruglanski, 
Thompson, & Spiegel, 1999). In contrast to dual-process theories of persuasion, the unimodel 
assumes only one single route of persuasion (Kruglanski et al., 1999; Kruglanski & 
Thompson, 1999). Kruglanski et al. (1999) argue that there is no qualitative difference 
between the two routes defined by the ELM and HSM. According to the unimodel, ”the two 
persuasion types (central/systematic and peripheral/heuristic) are fundamentally similar, in 
that both are mediated via ‘if then” or syllogistic reasoning from evidence to conclusion” 
(Kruglanski et al., 1999, p. 297). Kruglanski et al. (1999) further assume that both routes of 
persuasion may differ quantitatively on the extent of information processing. Low task 
involvement or limited capacity should lead to a restricted processing of relevant 
information, independently of the type of information. Whether low task involvement or 
limited cognitive capacity results in processing of verbal or non-verbal information depends 
on the length/complexity of the particular (verbal or non-verbal) information. We think that 
this view is in line with our interpretation of the results of the three experiments. Low task 
involvement (Experiment 1) or low cognitive capacity (Experiment 2 and 3) resulted in 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
Credibility Attribution 24
processing of information that is easier to use (e.g. nonverbal information), but not in 
processing of verbal information, which is more difficult to use. A test of the more specific 
predictions from dual-process theories that differ from the predictions of the unimodel goes 
beyond a scope of this paper. 
Overall, our studies have shown that dual-process theories can help us to understand the 
process of lie detection (see also Forrest & Feldman, 2000). These theories also allow 
predictions about the conditions under which people are worse or better lie detectors. 
However, the ultimate success in lie detection will depend on whether the cues that lie 
detectors use are, in fact, correlates of deception (see DePaulo et al., 2003; Reinhard et al., 
2002). 
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Footnotes 
 
1
 We found no significant effects of participants’ sex on the manipulation check-scales and 
on the credibility judgments, all p > .20. 
2 In a pretest (N = 24), participants (randomly assigned) saw one of the four versions of the 
short film and evaluated the plausibility of the verbal statements by Anna on five items 
(plausible, consistent, coherent, structured, specific). The truthful statements (M = 6.92) were 
judged to be significantly more plausible than the deceptive statements (M = 4.58), F(1, 20) = 
5.99, p < .05, r = .48. 
3 In another pretest, participants (N = 24) (randomly assigned) saw one of the four versions of 
the short film and were instructed to code the nonverbal behaviors of the actress. In the 
deceptive nonverbal information condition, participants recorded significantly more adaptors 
(F(1, 20) = 15.88, p < .005, r = .67), less direct eye gaze (F(1, 20) = 53.97, p < .001, r = .85), 
and more posture shifts (F(1, 20) = 233.06, p < .001, r = .96) than in the truthful nonverbal 
information condition (Ms = 1.58, 9.67, and 7.25 in the untruthful, and 0.08, 0.17, and 0.17 in 
the truthful conditions, respectively). 
4 Sex of participants produced no effects on the manipulation check-scales and on the 
credibility judgments, all F < 1. 
5 In a pretest (N = 104), the truthful statements (M = 5.70) were judged to be significantly 
more plausible than the deceptive statements (M = 5.05), F(1, 104) = 6.90, p < .05. 
6 Participants in a pretest (N = 40) judged the nonverbal behaviours of the actor in the 
deceptive nonverbal information condition as significantly more deceptive (M = 4.48) than in 
the truthful nonverbal information condition (M = 5.50), F(1, 38) = 8.46, p < .05. 
7
 In the high load condition, eighty-seven percent of participants remembered at least seven 
digits correctly, and 71.7 percent remembered all nine digits correctly. These results show 
that the participants - at least in part - directed their attention to the second task (see Paas et 
al., 2003, for a detailed description of secondary task techniques and cognitive load). The 
correct recall of the nine digit number was not related to the use of verbal and non-verbal 
information.   
8 In a separate analysis, positive verbal vs. nonverbal reasons were analyzed as a function of 
cognitive load, verbal cues, and nonverbal cues, using the type of reason as a repeated 
measure. The assumed interaction of cognitive load, verbal cues, and type of reason was not 
significant (F(1, 135) = 2.54, p = .11). When we analyzed solely negative verbal vs. 
nonverbal reasons as a function of cognitive load, verbal cues, and nonverbal cues, using the 
type of reason as a repeated measure, the assumed interaction of cognitive load, verbal cues, 
and type of reason was significant (F(1, 135) = 8.81, p < .005).  
9
 The results of the analysis including only the positive verbal and nonverbal reasons were in 
line with the hypotheses (interaction verbal with load: B = 0.56, t(137) = 2.46, p < .02). The 
results including only the negative verbal and nonverbal reasons were also in line with our 
assumptions (interaction verbal with load: B = -1.28, t(137) = -4.62, p < .001). 
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Table 1 
Means of Credibility Attribution as a Function of Participants' Involvement, Nonverbal, and 
Verbal Cues in Experiment 1 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 Nonverbal Verbal  Credibility 
Involvement Cue Cue  Attribution 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
Low Deceptive Deceptive  3.82 (0.86) 
  Truthful  4.05 (0.85) 
 
 Truthful Deceptive  5.38 (0.93) 
  Truthful  5.35 (1.60) 
 
High Deceptive Deceptive  4.31 (0.92) 
  Truthful  5.13 (1.22) 
 
 Truthful Deceptive  5.32 (1.18) 
  Truthful  6.58 (1.31) 
Note. N = 20 per cell. 1 = low credibility, 9 = high credibility. Standard deviations in 
parentheses. 
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Table 2 
Means of Credibility Attribution and Judgment of Truth or Deception as a Function of 
Participants' Cognitive Load, Nonverbal, and Verbal Cues in Experiment 2 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 Nonverbal Verbal Credibility Judgment of 
Load Cue Cue Attribution1 Truth or Deception2 
________________________________________________________________________ 
High Deceptive Deceptive 4.00 (0.78) 4.08 (1.15) 
  Truthful 4.22 (1.25) 4.04 (1.45) 
 
 Truthful Deceptive 5.17 (0.75) 5.52 (1.01) 
  Truthful 5.33 (0.67) 5.36 (1.19) 
 
Low Deceptive Deceptive 3.62 (0.77) 3.52 (1.23) 
  Truthful 4.74 (0.62) 4.88 (1.05) 
 
 Truthful Deceptive 4.62 (1.13) 4.60 (1.78) 
  Truthful 5.62 (1.55) 5.56 (1.69) 
 
Note. N = 25 per cell. 11 = low credibility, 9 = high credibility. 2 1 = deceptive to 9 = truthful. 
Standard deviations in parentheses. 
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Table 3 
Means of Credibility Attribution as a Function of Participants' Cognitive Load, Nonverbal, 
and Verbal Cues in Experiment 3 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 Nonverbal Verbal  Credibility 
Load Cue Cue  Attribution 
________________________________________________________________________ 
High Deceptive Deceptive  3.82 (0.74) 
  Truthful  4.00 (1.40) 
 
 Truthful Deceptive  5.27 (2.06) 
  Truthful  5.16 (2.02) 
 
Low Deceptive Deceptive  3.07 (1.29) 
  Truthful  4.26 (0.86) 
 
 Truthful Deceptive  3.92 (0.83) 
  Truthful  5.74 (1.84) 
 
Note. N = 18 per cell. 1 = low credibility, 9 = high credibility. Standard deviations in 
parentheses. 
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Table 4 
Mean Valence of Reasons as a Function of Participants' Cognitive Load, Verbal Cue, and 
Type of Reason  
________________________________________________________________________ 
Type of Cognitive Verbal  Valence of 
Reason  Load Cue  Reasons 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Nonverbal  High  Deceptive  -0.19 (1.50) 
  Truthful   -0.03 (1.16) 
 
 Low Deceptive  0.00 (1.26) 
  Truthful  0.28 (1.03) 
 
Verbal High Deceptive  0.92 (1.05) 
  Truthful  0.89 (1.14) 
 
 Low Deceptive  -0.33 (1.17) 
  Truthful  1.39 (1.15) 
Note. N = 36 per cell. Standard deviations in parentheses. 
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Table 5 
Summary of Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Credibility Attribution in 
Experiment 3 (N = 144) 
Variable B SE B β 
Cognitive Load 
Valence of verbal-
related reasons 
-0.42 
-0.31 
0.22 
0.19 
-0.13 
-.18 
Valence of nonverbal-
related reasons 
0.79 0.15 .47* 
Load × Valence of 
verbal-related reasons 
1.02 0.23 .49* 
Load × Valence of 
nonverbal-related 
reasons  
Total number of 
reasons 
-0.03 
 
 
0.16 
0.23 
 
 
0.11 
-.01 
 
 
0.10 
Note. * p < .001 
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